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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MICHAEL WARD,

Case No 20090714 CA

Petitioner and Appellant,
Trial Court No 080903379
vs
CAROLINE COATS GRAYDON,
Respondent and Appellee

REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER MICHAEL WARD

Petitioner Ward's Appellate Brief included citations to the various documents that
comprise the record on appeal

This reply brief includes a Corrected Statement of

Facts with citations to the record The Corrected Statement of Facts are identical to
those in Ward's Appellate Brief, only the citations have been changed

CORRECTED STATEMENT OF FACTS
1

By virtue of a series of property transactions, in late 2005, Ward became joint
owner with Peter Coats of two adjacent parcels of property in South Jordan, Salt
Lake County, State of Utah One parcel consisted of 18 acres, the other of 22
acres [hereinafter "North Parcel" and "South Parcel" respectively] Ward owned

1

an undivided 9 82% interest, and Peter Coats owned an undivided 90 18%
interest R 78 flf 2) and 85 flf 2)
2

Peter Coats and Graydon were previously married, having been divorced in a
bifurcated proceeding R 78-79 ffl 3) and 85-86 flf 3)

3

Graydon asserted claim to both the North and South Parcels by virtue of her
marriage In asserting her claims, Graydon caused a lis pendens and other
documents to be filed with the Office of the Salt Lake County Recorder to reflect
her claim of interest in both the North and South Parcels R 79 flj 4) and 86

(II4)
4

Both the North and South Parcels were subject to Trust Deeds in favor of Peter
Coats' mother, Isabel Coats Isabel Coats is also the grandmother of Ward, who
is the nephew of Peter Coats R 79 flf 5) and 86 flj 5)

5

As a part of the divorce proceeding between Graydon and Peter Coats Graydon
was granted a special power of attorney to deal with marital property including
its sale and disposition R 79 (|f 6), 86 flj 6), and 100-103

6

Graydon testified that she was granted a power of attorney to deal with the
marital property Peter Coats and Graydon were under an obligation to sell the
marital property R 106

7

In the fall of 2005, Isabel Coats proceeded to foreclose on her Trust Deeds over
both the North and South Parcels R 79 ffl 7) and 86 flj 7)

8

In a quiet title action brought by Isabel Coats, Graydon requested the Court grant
a temporary restraining order forbidding the sale of the property

Ultimately

Graydon and Isabel Coats entered into a stipulation R 79 flf 8) and 86 flj 8)

2

9.

The Amended Stipulation1 required Isabel Coats' cooperation in the sale of the
properties, agreed to a cancellation of the Notice of Default, and recognized
Isabel Coats' ownership of an undivided 9.82% interest in both the North and
South Parcels. R. 79 flf8), 86 (If 8), and 108-112.

10.

Subsequent to the entry of the Stipulation, Isabel Coats transferred her
ownership interest in the North and South Parcels to Ward in consideration of
One Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,000.00). R. 79-80 flf 9), 86-87 flj 9),
and 114-115.

11.

Isabel Coats commenced a second foreclosure proceeding against both the
North and South Parcels in the spring of 2006. R. 80 flf 13) and 87 fl[ 13).

12.

By the fall of 2006, Graydon filed another motion for a temporary restraining
order. The matter was contested in an evidentiary hearing on converting
Graydon's temporary restraining order motion into a preliminary injunction, which
was held before the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley on 5 December 2006. At the
conclusion of that hearing, Judge Medley concluded that Graydon had not
presented a case adequate for the issuance of a preliminary injunction, and
therefore dissolved the temporary restraining order and denied the request for a
preliminary injunction. R. 80 flj 14) and 87 (]f 14).

13.

Following the dissolution of the temporary restraining order, Isabel Coats
proceeded with the foreclosure sale. R. 80 fl[ 15) and 87 fl| 15).

1

The Amended Stipulation merely corrected aspects of the property description. The
substantive terms of the Amended Stipulation were identical to those of the original
Stipulation.
3

14.

The foreclosure sale was scheduled for 14 February 2007. R. 80 fl| 16) and 87
(1116).

15.

In the month prior to the Trustees Sale, Peter Coats worked diligently to procure
a purchaser for the property. R. 80 fl[ 17) and 87 (H 17).

16.

In the weeks and days preceding the foreclosure sale, Peter Coats was the
procuring cause of various offers of purchase. One of the offers for purchase
involved only the North Parcel, and was for the sum of Five Million Two Hundred
Thousand Dollars ($5,200,000.00). Ward and Peter Coats accepted that offer.
R. 80-81 ffi 18) and 87-88 flj 18).

17.

Graydon did not accept this offer. R. 81 flj 19) and 88 fl| 19).

18.

In the weeks and days preceding the Trustee's Sale, both Peter Coats and
Graydon made proposals and/or demands of conditions for closing. R. 81 (% 20)
and 88 (H 20).

19.

As a condition of closing, Graydon required Peter Coats agree to have his portion
of the sales proceeds deposited into an escrow account pending the resolution of
their divorce. R. 137-140.

20.

None of the offers to purchase were ever accepted since Graydon would not
accept any offer. R. 81 fl| 21) and 88 flj 21).

21.

Graydon was, at all time relevant, a licensed real estate agent and loan officer.
Because of this experience, Graydon knew that if she postponed reaching an
agreement on the terms of the sale and/or postponed the closing, she could
effectively hold the sale hostage. R. 81 fl[ 22) and 88 (Tf 22).

4

22.

Ward indicated to both Graydon and Peter Coats that he would accept any
reasonable proposals for closing instruction which either of them might propose.
R. 81 (1| 24) and 88 (H 24).

23.

No sale offer was accepted and the North Parcel was subject to a foreclosure
sale or ' - March ?0CP R PI ^ ?fu and 88 (]\ 25). '

24.

Accordingly, the property was sold at a Trustee's Sale on 15 March 2007, for the
sum o< T h i ^ Million Si) Hundred Thousand Dollars (i:\ 600,000 00- h '142146.

25.

Had Graydon and Peter Coats agreed to accept the highest offer, Ward would
have been entitled to 9.82% of $5.2 million, or $510,640.00. Instead, Ward
received only $195,397.28, representing 9.82% of the excess proceeds. R. 82
(H 27) and 89 (H 27).

26.

Subsequent to the Trustee's Sale, on 10 November 2008, Judge Atherton
entered a supplei i lental decree of divot ce ii i Gi aydon;s and Peter Coats' divorce
action. Pursuant to the Supplemental Decree, Graydon was awarded damages
against Peter Coats, which damages amounted to the portion of the sales
proceeds she would have received had tne property sold for S5 2 million. R 120-

129.
27.

Ward broi ight an action for dan sages for the lor.r- of fhf benefit of the offei foi
$5.2 million against Graydon and Peter Coats. R. 150-171.

28.

Ward ni:»\/fsd toi Summarv Judjment on ; Mar :h 200?

i tie

'^;JUI t det lied

motion, awarded summary judgment to Graydon, and dismissed Ward's

5

his

complaint against Graydon with prejudice. Graydon was also awarded costs as
against Ward. R. 319-322.
29.

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Ward as against Peter
Coats. R. 319-322.

30.

Peter Coats sought to have the trial court reverse its judgment, but his motion
was denied. R. 411-413.

ARGUMENT
The underlying basis of Graydon's case is the untenable notion that her rights to
the property in dispute are somehow segregable from any responsibilities that those
rights include. Though not formally on title, Graydon has exercised power over the
disposition of the property throughout this ordeal in multiple ways: she has filed a lis
pendens, sought temporary restraining orders, obtained a court order in her divorce
precluding the dissipation of marital assets, and was granted a power of attorney related
to the sale of the property. Under these various powers, Graydon had an absolute veto
over any sale of the north and south parcels. When the rancor of their divorce
prevented she and Peter Coats from agreeing to acceptable stipulations on the sale of
the property, Graydon exercised that power to prevent a sale of the property for
$5,200,000.00. It is undisputed that if that sale had occurred, Ward would have
received 9.82% of that amount (minus commissions and costs of sale) instead of the
lesser amount the property sold for in foreclosure.2 Thus, the actual and proximate

2

Graydon additionally contends that through the voluntary subordination of his interest,
Ward caused his own injury and thus became "the sole architect of his downfall".
Graydon's assertion erroneously assumes that the outcome of such subordination
6

cause of Ward's injury was the acrimonious bickering between Coats and Graydon and
. j i - \ their decision to spoil the sale. Having exercised rights over the property,
Graydon now seeks to eliminate her culpability for Ward s iniurRs by at1ompiinq to
sever those rights from the responsibilities inherent in their operation. This she cannot
do.
Graydon's position is made all the more indefensible by her own successful
efforts to recover dan tages foi ti le failed sale,,, After she and Peter Coats jointly scuttled
the sale, Graydon sought and received a judgment against Peter Coats for the amount
Graydon would have received had the sale been completed In other words, Graydon
recovered on grounds identical to those advocated h\ Wa"" M the present case bui 10:
the failure to close the sale, she would have received a greater amount. Yet, despite
hei ov\ n i recovery foi the failed sale, Gi aydon cm iously suggests that 'while she - not on
title or a joint owner - is entitled to her share of the value of the property as if it had sold
fo lz 1 .vi,.....

v . - c joint tenant - is not This proposition, that a divorcing spouse

with only a marital interest in property is entitled to recover foi the loss of vaiip in such
property, while an owner of the property is not, defies logic and controverts basic
notions of fairness and e; J:

~>.v '-•>*• -n wac pamali\ responsible 1or sw n bs^ in

value only further underscores the inconsistent and discrepant nature of Graydon's
position.

affects Ward's ability to recover. This is not the case. Had the sale to Hagen gone
through, whether Ward's interest was superior or junior to the trust deed would have
been immaterial. The only difference it makes would go to the amount of Ward's
damages, not his right to recover. Thus, Ward's voluntary subordination of his interest
has no bearing on his right to recover.
7

I.

JOINT TENANCY NECESSARILY IMPOSES DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS ON
COTENANTS
Because joint tenancy creates a cooperative community of interest dependent

upon good faith, Utah law imposes duties and obligations upon cotenants. Graydon's
responsive brief attempts to obfuscate this issue by suggesting Ward's argument is
based on the existence of a cotenant's alleged duty to sell real estate, an argument
Ward has never made. Rather, Ward has made the broader point that by virtue of their
joint interests, cotenants stand in a unique relationship to one another, and that under
the specific and unusual facts and circumstances of this case, Graydon's refusal to
cooperate in the sale of real estate violated the reciprocal obligations inherent in the
community of interest shared by Graydon, Coats, and Ward.
It is undisputed, even by Graydon, that Utah law recognizes that a special
relationship of confidence and trust exists among cotenants. In Jolley v. Corry, 671
P.2d 139 (Utah 1983) Utah's Supreme Court reaffirmed the existence of such a
relationship and indicated that it necessarily included the imposition of obligations upon
cotenants. Without reaching the question of whether those obligation rose to the level
of a fiduciary duty, the Jolley Court concluded that the relationship among joint tenants
precluded a cotenant from defaulting on an obligation and then attempting to extinguish
the interest of his cotenants by purchasing the property at a foreclosure sale. While the
Utah Supreme Court in Jolley opted not to decide whether a cotenant is under a
fiduciary duty in every conceivable circumstance, the Court made two clear points: 1) in
at least some circumstances, cotenants have a fiduciary duty to one another; and 2)
8

without using the label of "fiduciary," cotenants have obligations to one another, the
violation of which warrants legal redress. Whatever we call these responsibilities,
whether fiduciary duties, reciprocal obligations, 01 ott lei wise,, is immaterial: i egarcliess of
the label, mutual duties are an innate part of membership in the community of interest
among cotenarv.,.,
The line of cases cited by Ward in his brief in chief stand for this proposition.
Whethei the case involves one cotenant's adverse possession against others or a
cotenant's purchase of property at a foreclosure sale, Utah coi jrts have consistei itly
recognized that cotenants cannot disregard the rights of their peers r o n t tenancy.
The essential pr & mis^ of thesp lines of case" - - -' •

*i ~ s.-?..r

—

-

created in joint tenancy, cotenants owe a duty to one another. At the very least, this
(,..

.

- jr- -

-^.-/. ,*

: - .

.jede a joint tenant's efforts to enjoy their

interest in the property. Yet Graydon and Coats allowed their personal dispute to stand
in the way of Ward realizing the full value of his interest in the parcel all to the mutual
harm of the community.
Perhaps most peculiar is Graydon's denial of the existence of this duty here, in
the face of her i eiiance on it ii i he: successful actioi 11 :> i eco> ei agaii ist Coats,, In the
divorce proceedings, Graydon did not receive an arbitrary or indiscriminate award for
soni- inaisiinc! cjnturnaoioi!: ootiduc 1 o! K..oats, she received the amount she would
have been entitled to had the sale closed. According to the Supplemental Decree of
Divorce, because of the failure of the sale Graydon 'received approximately
$931,000.00, rather than [the] $1,454,508.30" she woi ild have • received had ti le
property sold for $5,200,000.00

R. 123-125. As a result of the failure to close the sale,

the court assessed the loss in value ragamst Coats, who was ordered to pay Graydon
the difference between the amount she actually received and the amount she would
have received if the sale had been completed Had Coats not had a duty to prevent the
dissipation of the property s value, Graydon would have had no basis for recovery As a
divorcing spouse with only a marital interest in the north and south parcels, Graydon
sought the assistance of a court to preserve an asset over which she had no legal
interest The court's willingness to intervene stemmed from its recognition of Peter
Coats duty to conserve and maintain the value of his property, and the underlying
public policies that give rise to such a duty Vvhatever justifications Graydon think entitle
her to recover for the failed sale, those same justifications must be even more
applicable to a co-tenant with actual ownership, as they serve the same public policy
interests
Graydon further acknowledges that cotenants do have fiduciary duties under the
facts and circumstances of specific cases The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that
two such situations are 1) a cotenant attempting to adversely possess against other
cotenants, and 2) a cotenant suffering default on property, and then extinguishing the
interest of the others by purchasing it at the resulting foreclosure sale See Olwell v
Clark, 658 P.2d 585 (1982), and Jolley v Corry, 671 P.2d 139 (1983) The rationale
behind these rulings is the same namely, that one cotenant should not be allowed to
benefit by disadvantaging other cotenants This is exactly what has happened in the
instant case Coats, as a cotenant with Ward, and Graydon, as the functional
equivalent of a cotenant, allowed personal resentments to interfere with and ultimately
thwart the sale of the property to Hagen, in the processing diminishing the value of

10

Ward s interest Subsequently, Graydon sought and received compensation from Coats
for the damages she allegedly incurred, in the process receiving a benefit for having
cooperated in disadvantaging Ward Thus, the facts of this case are analogous to
Olwell and Jolley, and precisely the type in which the imposition of fiduciary duties is
appropriate

II.

BECAUSE OF THE MULTIPLE LEGAL POWERS THAT SHE EXERCISED
OVER THE PROPERTY, GRAYDON HAD OBLIGATIONS TO WARD
In her brief, Graydon seeks to downplay her accountability by suggesting that as

a divorcing spouse not on title, she had only a peripheral interest in the marital property
and failed transaction But Graydon is not an ordinary divorcing spouse she had a
power of attorney related to the sale of the property, she filed a lis pendens on the
property, she initiated legal proceedings related to the property, and she obtained a
court order in her divorce action governing the property Throughout this case, she has
exercised these powers to such an extent tnat she cannot now claim to be a passive
party, detached from these events, solely to avoid responsibility for the harm her actions
helped to create
Graydon relies on her contention, which she claims Ward has conceded that the
power of attorney granted to her in the divorce proceeding was wholly ineffective in
giving Graydon the power to sell or convey the property But Graydon misapprehends
the point Whether Graydon theoretically could have sold or conveyed the property
under her power of attorney is irrelevant What is of consequence is that in spite of any
possible infirmities in the power of attorney, Graydon did have the ability, pursuant to
the order and the lis pendens, to prevent the sale of the property That the combined

11

effect of these legal rights gave Graydon the means to obstruct the sale of the property
is evident, as she did just that Because she did in fact have the capability to prohibit
the sale, Graydon's attempt to minimize her culpability by understating her authority
under the power of attorney misses the mark
Moreover, by attempting to pull the separate strands of authority apart, Graydon
ignores the combined effect of these strands when taken together In addition to the
power to prevent the sale, the combination of her legal rights also gave Graydon the
ability to close the sale Graydon made her assent contingent upon Coats agreeing to
escrow the proceeds of the sale Pursuant to the anti-dissipation order, she had the
power to enforce this condition When Coats refused to agree to it, Graydon could have
asked the court to impose the condition to allow the sale to go forward Yet during the
nearly two months that the offer to purchase the property for $5,200,000 00 was
pending, Graydon did nothing to prevent the dissipation of the property or to seek
enforcement of the anti-dissipation order Instead she chose recalcitrance, blamed the
collapse of the sale on Coats, and sought damages from him
Graydon also argues that she exercised the power of attorney as an agent of
Peter Coats, and therefore could not have been a cotenant of Ward This argument is
mentless To suggest that when she vetoed the sale to Hagen and thereby diminished
the value of Peter Coats' interest, Graydon was acting as the agent of Peter Coats is
farcical Agency, by its very nature, includes an obligation to protect the interests of the
principal, something Graydon did not do Graydon not only failed to protect the interests
of Peter Coats pursuant to her power of attorney, but also successfully sought damages
from him for her alleged injury as a result of her own actions At all times relevant,

12

Graydon used the power of attorney to only further her own interests Under these
circumstances efforts to characterize Graydon's actions as those of an agent are
illogical and warrantless
Even if accepted, Graydon s argument that she was the agent of Coats would
support Ward s position As the reputed agent of Coats, Graydon would have owed him
fiduciary duties She also would have stood in his shoes, in effect making her the cotenant of Ward And as Coats' agent, she could have personal liability to a third party
for her actions as such By purporting to be the agent of Coats, Graydon actually
buttresses the justifications for recognizing the obligations she owed to Ward
Finally, Graydon claims that her damages against Peter Coats for the value of
the ruined sale are distinguishable from those sought by Ward, because those damages
were premised on his dissipation of marital property, and Ward has never been married
to Coats In her endeavor to sever the rights of power from any obligations resulting
from their action, Graydon suggests that Peter Coats is alone responsible for any
injuries resulting from the failed sale And while she reluctantly concedes Ward has
suffered an injury, Graydon believes that only she is the victim of Coats exploits, and
therefore hers is the type of injury worthy of redress, while Ward's is not This
conclusion is preposterous Graydon's marital interest in the property should not
provide greater rights and protections than those of an owner Nor is Graydon a
passive victim She employed her rights to block a sale of the property, in the process
participating in the creation of the injury she subsequently obtained compensation for
As her own recovery makes clear, Graydon recognizes that the failure to close the sale

13

is a legally cognizable harm Since her actions helped to produce the injury to Ward, he
is entitled to a similar recovery against she and Coats

III.

THERE ARE NO DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT PRECLUDING AN
AWARD OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO WARD
Graydon's brief alleges that even if Ward s legal theory is sustained, material

issues of disputed fact still preclude an award of summary judgment In support of this
allegation, Graydon lists three items, each of which she contends raises factual
questions sufficient to overcome Ward s Summary Judgment Motion As is shown
below, none of the items listed are sufficient to obstruct an award of summary judgment
to Ward
A.

Graydon's Actions Breached Her Obligations

As addressed in sections I and II above, Graydon and Peter Coats did breach
their obligations to Ward In yet another attempt to uncouple the exercise of authority
from its obligations, Graydon suggests that her choice to prevent tne sale to Hagen was
reasonable under the circumstances, and therefore she should not be responsible for
the resulting injury sustained by Ward However in the month preceding the
foreclosure sale, Graydon refused to cooperate in reaching a workable compromise that
would enable the sale to go forward, made no effort to secure an alternative means of
protecting her interests, and did nothing to mitigate the concomitant harm to Ward
Because of her unbending 'all or nothing' demand that Peter Coats escrow his share of
the proceeds, Graydon disregarded several reasonable alternatives that would have
facilitated the sale to Hagen while protecting her interests, including seeking a court
order governing the income from the sale Instead of proactiveiy working to arrange a

14

resolution that would profit all parties, Graydon chose intransigence, waited for the sale
to spoil, and then sought and received a benefit for only herself Having successfully
exercised her power of attorney to deny Ward his legitimate interest, Graydon now
seeks to evade responsibility by claiming her actions were necessary to prevent the
dissipation of the property But Peter Coats' expeditious and equal distribution of his
share of the proceeds from the foreclosure lays bare the absurdity of her supposed
concerns Under the circumstances, her actions were neither reasonable nor
necessary, and represent a breach of her obligations to Ward

B.

The Failure to Close the Sale to Hagen is Immaterial and Graydon
Should Be Estopped From Arguing It

Graydon argues that whether the sale to Hagen would have closed is a question
of fact that precludes an award of summary judgment to Ward This argument seems
somewhat presumptuous considering Graydon collected the value of her inchoate
interest in the property as if it had sold for $5,200,000 00 despite insufficient evidence
that any and all contingencies to closing were satisfied Having prevailed
notwithstanding such uncertainty, Graydon should not be permitted to now assert it as
an impediment to summary judgment Under the doctrine of judicial estoppel a person
may not, to the prejudice of another person, deny any position taken in a prior judicial
proceeding involving the same subject matter if that person successfully maintained
such a position D U Co Inc v Jenkins, 216 P 3d 360 (Ut App 2009) Graydon has
already successfully recovered for the amount she would have received had the sale
closed, she should therefore be precluded from attempting to reverse position in this
case Moreover, her acknowledgment of a signed contract invalidates her argument
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Whether or not the sale would have closed is immaterial, as Hagen's failure to satisfy
the contract would have given Ward a cause of action for breach of contract

C.

The Amount of Ward's Damages is Not In Dispute

Finally, Graydon contends that the amount of Ward s damages is unascertained
(and possibly in dispute), and therefore summary judgment would be inappropriate
Such is not the case Ward's Statement of Facts includes the additional amount Ward
would have received had the sale to Hagen closed Calculation of Ward's percentage
of the costs of sale (including broker commissions) can be quickly and easily
determined, and is not the type of subject that is prone to factual dispute

The offer to

sell to Hagen was for $5,200,000 00, had that sale closed, it would have included a sum
certain commission of 6% If the sale had closed, Ward's 9 82% interest in the property
would have been $510,640 00 minus 6%, or $30,638 40, for commissions Ward would
have received $480 001 60 Instead, Ward received $195 397 28 The difference
between these amounts, $284,604 32, is the amount in which Ward has been damaged
Thus, nothing related to the amount of Ward's damages poses an obstruction to an
award of summary judgment in Ward s favor

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner Ward respectfully requests that Trial Court's
granting of summary judgment to Graydon be reversed and remanded and that the
Trial Court's denial of Ward's motion for summary judgment also be reversed and
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remanded, and an instruction be given to enter an order granting summary judgment in
favor of Petitioner Ward.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Z 3

day of August 2010.
Stevenson and Smith, P.C.

irad C. Smith
Attorney for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

ffi

day of August 2010, I mailed, postage prepaid,

two true and correct copies of the foregoing document to:

Bryce D. Panzer
BLACKBURN & STOLL, L.C.
257 East 200 South, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2142
Attorney for Appellee Graydon
Craig S. Cook
3645 East 3100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Attorney for Appellee and Cross Appellant Coats

t
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